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ALBERTO CEVOLINI*
Abstract This article deals with the social meaning of insurance contracts in the
late medieval and modern society. Starting from the empirical analysis of one of the
early marine insurance contracts which were stipulated in the second half of the 14th
century, the hypothesis is suggested that the premium rate coincides with the
estimated average frequency of sea accidents. By means of a proto-probability
calculus, rate was used by the early insurers for trading risks. Therefore the main
thesis arises that insurance premium is a way of giving a certain price to the
uncertainty of the future and that it indeed represents the cost of such observation.
A comparison with the original function of money in primitive societies based on
reciprocity is finally developed in order to explain how time construction is contin-
gent on social structures.
*****
1. Introduction
Insurance is undoubtedly one of the most widely studied institu-
tions of modern society, yet at the same time one of those least
known by the social sciences. Only recently the idea that the
sociology of risk should also include a sociology of insurance has
been seriously taken into consideration, yet insurance “remains in
the background in social sciences” and a real sociology of insurance
is still “nascent”.1 What is lacking is above all a theory that can
observe insurance against the backdrop of society and the trans-
formation of its structures between the 14th and 18th centuries.
Sociology should take on this task, albeit without overlooking the
contributions offered by the history of law and economics.
The aim of this article is to lay the foundations for a social theory
of this kind on the basis of the empirical results of historical
research into the origins of the insurance contract and on the basis
of some fundamental principles of insurance theory in economics.
§ 2 provides an outline of the key stages which, between the first
and the second half of the 14th century, led to the invention and
juridical perfection of the marine insurance contract. The paragon
contract that is taken into consideration is a Tuscan policy dated
1385, which – through the mediation of the Lloyd’s policy – is now
the basis of the contemporary Japanese marine insurance contract.
Going on the hypothesis that the premium rate corresponds to the
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estimated frequency of claims, the thesis proposed is that the
insurance premium is the price of the observation of the future. §
3 shows how this thesis is confirmed by the modern economic
theory of the estimate of the pure premium. The insurance insti-
tution thus appears to be a way in which the paradox of putting a
certain price on the future-referred uncertainty may be managed.
The paradox is unfolded by means of a fiction, i.e. the calculus of
probabilities, that only during the 18th century is finally conceived
of as a viable means to determine the price of life annuities. The
evolutionary advancement occurs when instead of simply calculat-
ing a bet, people bet on calculus. § 4 introduces the idea that an
insurance-based society builds a proper time over the time through
the construction of periods marked by temporal breaks which have
no real correlation in the flowing time. The hypothesis is that the
high abstraction of this operation is a by-product of the higher
complexity of the modern society compared to primitive societies
based on interaction. Money and reciprocity are thus conceived of
as functional equivalents for the social production of time (§ 5).
Lastly some advantages of insurance compared to other ways of
addressing the future uncertainty through the medium of money,
such as saving for example, are taken into consideration (§ 6). In
the conclusion, it is suggested that the generalized willingness to
run risks represents a new form of “social solidarity”, and that
modern society should be defined in this very sense as an insur-
ance society.
2. Observing Future Has a Price
The origin of the insurance contract may be reconstructed histori-
cally only with a certain margin of approximation. This kind of
contract is most likely to have begun being stipulated in the first
quarter of the 14th century by Italian merchants operating between
Genoa and Tuscany. In the ledgers of a modest Pisan businessman,
Vanni di Bonagiunta di Stefano, Marcello Berti (1985: 417ff.) came
across an account addressed to Gerardo Gambacorta dated 1322,
in which it appears that Gerardo insured Vanni (“Gerardo
Ganbachorta et li chonpagni [. . .] mi sigurò”) for the sum of 400
golden florins for seven bales of Pisan cloth which were to be
transported on a ship belonging to Andrea di Bando of Porto Pisano
to Salerno. In the contract it is specified that the good would travel
“at the risk of sea and people” (“a rischio di mare et di gente”) and
that for this insurance cover (“per la sigurtà”) Vanni was to pay 26
florins, meaning a rate of 61⁄2%. On receiving news of the safe
arrival of the goods in a letter dated 7th September, which reached
Pisa on the 20th of the same month, Vanni states that he is “quite
Time Construction in Insurance Society
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 29 No. 2 June 2016
161
satisfied” (“bene chontento”). From the note in the ledger, it is not
clear whether the premium was paid beforehand or only on the safe
arrival of the goods, as would appear to have been the case. Be as
it may, there is little doubt that this is an insurance contract to all
effects and purposes.
Marine insurance did not immediately substitute the more con-
solidated sea loan, but continued to be practiced successfully
throughout the first half of the 14th century. Proof of this is to be
found in the so-called Palermitan contracts, unearthed in the
archive of the public notary Stefano d’Amato and dating back to
1350 (cf. Zeno 1936, Doc. CXCI: 230f.). The contracts are stipulated
in Latin by Genoese merchants operating in Sicily and unquestion-
ably feature all the requisites of marine insurance. On 15th March
1350, for example, the Genoese Leonardo Cattaneo and Isnardo
Usumare declared that they had voluntarily insured (“sponte
assecuraverunt”) the wheat that Alaono Grillo, a Genoese mer-
chant, meant to transport on the sailing ship belonging to Daniele
Pellegrino of Sciacca to Tunis. The overall compensation amounted
to 30 gold ounces; Grillo paid four and a half ounces in advance,
which corresponds to a premium rate of 15%. The insurers take on
all risks of sea and persons (“suscipientes in se et super se omnem
risicum periculum et fortunam dei maris et gentium quod et quam
de predictis mercibus pervenire contigerit”) and commit to paying
compensation within a month of the arrival of any news constitut-
ing cause for a claim to be made (“infra mensem unum habitis
certis novis de damno et sinistro predicto”).
In the second half of the 14th century, particularly in Tuscany,
early marine insurance contracts obtained a remarkable degree of
juridical perfection; for this reason they were to serve as a model of
reference for all modern marine insurance.2 Furthermore, the very
fact that they are drawn up in an open form and in the Italian
vernacular demonstrates the wide diffusion that these contracts
reached in little over 50 years. A single policy may serve as a
paragon case. In 1385 Francesco di Marco da Prato & Co. arranged
insurance with three merchants on a cargo worth 400 florins
travelling from Arles up to Porto Pisano, paying a 5% premium rate.
Michele del Voglia & Co. committed themselves to an indemnity of
150 florins, Bartolomeo and Piero del Voglia to 150 florins and
Michele di Carlo degli Strozzi to 100 florins. The insurance cover
therefore implied a total premium of 20 florins, with a profit of 7.50
florins for each of the first two co-insurers and 5.00 florins for the
third (cf. Bensa 1884, Doc. XI: 210–212).
The fundamental features of such contracts may be summed up in
a few main points. First, they are insurances of fixed sums; this
means that the limit of indemnity is established in advance and is
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normally equal to all or part of the value of the cargo insured. The
premium is calculated as a percentage of the insured value. For
medieval merchants, such a relation was taken for granted to the
extent that it could be left out of written contracts; while these do
indeedmention the premium rates, they never specify the sum these
rates relate to. Moreover, in early insurance contractsmany insurers
were already involved in covering risks. Each co-insurer could
decide, through previous communicationwith the broker, the limit of
indemnity to which he bound himself; he would then underwrite it in
the contract but take no responsibility for the insolvency of the other
co-insurers. Prepayment is, in all cases, the most important prereq-
uisite for the conclusion of the contract; signing a contract without
co-insurers cashing the premium would render it void.3 In this way,
each co-insurer – through simple subtraction – could calculate in
advance what his total loss would have been in the event of a claim.
For Michele del Voglia & Co., for instance, the total loss would have
been 150.00 − 7.50 = 142.50 florins; for Michele di Carlo degli
Strozzi, 100.00 − 5.00 = 95.00 florins.
Now, in relation to each co-insurer, if one compares the two bare
sums at the opening and conclusion of the insurance business (i.e.
the total premium on one hand and the total loss on the other:
7.50/142.50 or 5.00/95.00), their difference is very clear. In the
first case, the payment is certain (i.e. necessary) and happens in
the actual present whenever one takes out an insurance policy; in
the second case, the payment is uncertain (i.e. contingent) and
happens, if at all, in a future present. The temporal difference
between these operations represents the risk of insurance. The
question is: what is the insurer’s motivation4 in concluding this
kind of contract simply on the basis of a comparison of these two
bare sums? It would seem, if one takes into account the fact that
the calculus of probabilities was not available in the 14th century,
that there is a lack of orienting criteria. The only way out of this
conundrum is to temporarily give it up and focus instead on empiri-
cal observation.
From the very beginning, the premium is set not in the form of a
bare sum, but as a percentage of the insured cargo’s value. We lack
a general historical study of the variation in premium rates in the
Mediterranean sea between the 14th and 16th centuries, largely
because it would be practically impossible. The empirical data in our
possession are incomplete and often circumscribed to geographical
areas such as the commercial circles of Genoa, Venice or Ragusa.5
When the insurance negotiation process wasmanaged by amediator
(a broker), and not by a public notary, the stipulator of the policy was
not obliged to conserve his documents, most of which may therefore
be given up for lost. Historians sometimesmanage to get around this
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obstacle by studying the accounting ledgers of the merchants them-
selves, who tended to record the costs of insurance with great
accuracy, both on the active and passive side, also adding informa-
tion on the journey to be undertaken, the boat, the goods and the
names of the insurers.
This is linked to the secondary issue regarding the criteria to be
followed to calculate the premium rate. The most plausible hypoth-
esis is that the merchants adopted an approach based on their own
experience, as Benedetto Cotrugli (1602 [1573]: 75) in fact suggests
in his treatise on trade, according to which, insurers must “aprir
molto bene l’occhio alle novelle del mare, & al continuo dimandare,
& spiare di corsari, di malagente, di guerre, di tregue, e di
ripresaglie, & di tutte quelle cose che possono perturbare il mare.
Debbono [. . .] sapere porti, spiage, distantie di luoco a luoco, &
considerare la conditione delli patroni, & delli mercanti che
assicurare si fanno, & delli navilij [. . .]” (“keep their ears well open
to news of the seas, and to the ceaseless questioning and spying of
corsairs, of ne’er-do-wells, not to mention of wars, of ceasefires and
reprisals, and all else that may insettle the waterways. They must
[. . .] know the ports, the coves, the distances from one harbour to
another, and consider the condition of the patrons and of the
merchants who ask to be insured, as well as that of their fleets
[. . .]”).
In general, it does not seem that distance plays a decisive role in
the setting of the premium; travels to nearby ports reachable only
via dangerous routes, such as those along the coasts of Corsica or
Sardinia where there was a greater risk of so-called men-dangers,
laid claims of higher premiums. However, it is more difficult to
evaluate the impact of the seasons on navigation risks, although
good sense would suggest that in seasons such as autumn, the
rates would be higher due to the greater risks of stormy seas.
Indeed, already in the ancient sea loan it was quite normal to insert
a clause in the contract that foresaw a variation in interest rates on
the sum lent for a return voyage on the basis of the season in which
the ship was to leave harbour once it had reached its port of call.6
It is also clear that the goods loaded were virtually irrelevant in
terms of the calculation of the premium rate, for what was insured
was the overall value of the load, not its nature. On the other hand,
great attention is placed on the type of craft used for the transpor-
tation of goods: not so much in view of its seaworthiness, but rather
in terms of its defence capacities against attacks from pirates.
Be as it may, empirical research shows that despite the inevitable
oscillations and deviances, by and large, premium rates show a
remarkable degree of uniformity and congruence; any calculation
was therefore carried out not arbitrarily but on the basis of rational
Alberto Cevolini
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 29 No. 2 June 2016
164
methods. Two further questions therefore arise. How can rates be
calculated in order to determine the insurance premium? And why
is the premium set in the form of a rate? The second question is the
fundamental one, and the possibility of answering the first question
depends on the second one. In historical law and economic litera-
ture there is neither the answer nor even the question.
By connecting the main features of early marine insurance con-
tracts, it is possible to maintain a hypothesis based on a simple and
every time fitting idea (that is, whatever the value of the cargo and
the fixed premium rate, the result fits every time). Let us suppose
that the premium rate coincides with the estimated average fre-
quency h of sea accidents (leaving aside the question of whether
they are sea-dangers, man-dangers, or a combination of both). In
the 1385 contract, the co-insurers estimate that on average five
cargos out of 100, under the conditions standing at the moment the
contract is concluded, go astray. Each co-insurer may now
compare a certain profit (7.50 or 5.00 florins) with the probability of
loss (h · 142.50 = 7.125 or h · 95.00 = 4.75), eliciting a difference
that motivates him to undertake the risk. This estimate obviously
does not coincide with the co-insurer’s future present (if the acci-
dent happens, each co-insurer has to pay out 150.00 or 100.00
florins), but with his present future: in other words, it coincides
with his own observation of the future.
The advantage of this operation lies in the fact that it makes
uncertainty manageable. After all, this is what insurance is: a
“business of uncertainties” (Ericson and Doyle 2004: 148). It doesn’t
produce more safety than before – the fact of being insured has no
effect on the likelihood of encountering adversity – but rather it
allows the parties to buy and sell that lack of information which is
experienced as opacity of the future. This trade cannot be practised
in an arbitrary fashion but must be based on a procedure which at
least gives the illusion of being able to control that which is and
remains uncontrollable. The illusion of control is obtained via
calculation. Yet the single case, i.e. what happens in reality, cannot
be pinned down to calculation. The solution lies in the construction,
through the grouping together of similar cases, of a secondary reality
to which one might refer – in the simplest of forms: the statistical
mean.7 In this way, a not-calculable uncertainty is turned into a
calculable one, while the issue of residual uncertainty is managed by
checking the degree of correctness of the calculation and by bar-
gaining with a possible post-decisional regret.
After all, if the future could be calculated there would be nothing
else left to calculate. In each estimate of the future, the paradox of
the calculus of its incalculability is unfolded. The fictitious nature of
this construction may be fully understood as soon as it is noted that
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in order to transform not-calculable in calculable uncertainty, the
pattern of past cases (those of which experience has been had) is
transferred onto the future which has yet to take place. In this
manner the insurer compensates for his inevitable cognitive limit, he
so to speak gains a gaze on the future by turning memory into
expectation. That is a real induction performance, yet the perform-
ing system is not consciousness but society. The implicit – and above
all indemonstrable – supposition of such reasoning is that the future
shall behave in the same way as the past. That is why risk can only
be observed in the medium of probability:8 the bare sum 142.50 (or
95.00) gives no measure of the uncertainty one has to cope with; on
the contrary, the product h · 142.50 = 7.125 (or h · 95.00 = 4.75)
does. This product is the future as it can be observed from the
present. The cost of such observation is the insurance premium.
The plausibility of this scientific explanation may be further
verified through some reflections. First of all, the premium does not
represent the cost of the future as such; if it did, one could not
explain why every co-insurer expects a gain of 7.50 (or 5.00) when
aware of the possibility of losing 150.00 (or 100.00). At the same
time, one could not explain why the policyholder may receive an
indemnity larger than the premium paid or, conversely, why he has
to pay for an event that does not happen. Rather, the premium
represents the cost of the observation of the future, twice over: once
by the insurer, who makes use of a very selective construction of
the past in order to project inferences about the future; and once by
the policyholder, who estimates the risk in relation to his own
capital. This is what finally drives the decision on whether it is
worthwhile to pay the insurance premium or whether it is better to
abstain, which in itself involves a risk.
The reasoning is, moreover, based on the fact that unlike the
actual present the future is contingent. If the future were impos-
sible, the policyholder would have no reason to insure himself; if
the future were necessary, the insurer would have no reason to
provide insurance (hence the problems which arise with retroactive
insurance contracts). The observation of future on the basis of a
premium rate in this respect replicates the logical structure of
future contingencies, about which the only thing one can know
with certainty in every actual present is that the future is uncer-
tain. Or as Lessio said: the uncertainty of capital must be first of all
reduced to a certain price.9
To achieve such reasoning, however, one has not to elaborate
probabilistic calculus; instead, one must have a certain awareness
of the average frequency of disasters in maritime trade. If one takes
into account that the insurers themselves were traders who under-
wrote insurance contracts in both active and passive ways, the
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conclusion is that each of them was without any doubt in posses-
sion of this information.10 Here, the broker who received the
demand and combined it with the available supply also played a
central role. In insurance markets like the one in Venice, for
instance, the broker took an active part in quantifying the premium
rate, and his credibility was based on the reliability of his informa-
tion (Nehlsen-von Stryk 1988: 82ff., 86; Tucci 1981: 149ff.). In this
case, any asymmetry in the information pertains not to the rela-
tionship between insured and insurer, but to that between broker
and insurer, and is somehow slackened by the fact that the insur-
ers themselves know the tricks of the trade. The premium, finally,
doesn’t depend immediately on the cargo’s value: cargo of lower
value cold be insured at a larger premium rate. What really matters
is not the object insured (i.e. the concrete reality), but rather the
observation of the uncertainty of the future. Hence Molina states
that the premium (rate) either increases or decreases not only on
the basis of the insured cargo’s value, but also on the basis of the
greater or lesser danger to which the insurer is exposed.11 Risk, in
other terms, cannot be defined as a thing, but rather as a form of
observation.
3. Calculating Bets and Betting on Calculus
And modern insurance? The economic theory of insurance distin-
guishes between a net premium and a gross premium. The starting
point for calculating the premium is the so-called “principle of
equivalence”, according to which the indemnity payments expected
by the company must be at least equal to the sum of the incoming
net premium. To put it in another way: the net premium must
coincide with the expected value of future indemnities (cf. Mahr
1951: 136ff.; Innami 1966; Farny 1995: 54). If N is the number of
bets which are taken by the insurance society, P the net premium
for each bet, T the total number of accidents and D the average sum
of indemnity, the principle of equivalence can be simply defined as
follows: N · P = T · D. Hence the net premium is: P = T/N · D. But
the proportion T/N is simply the number of expected accidents
against the total number of bets taken, which is the expected
average frequency of accidents. Such a variable has already been
marked with the symbol h. From the principle of equivalence, the
bare net premium is, as a result, given by the equation: P = h · D.
While indemnity is quantified in advance for fixed sum insurance,
for interest based insurance indemnity depends on the claim and
the presence of franchises within the insurance policy. In the first
case, the calculus of net premium is relatively easy: it is enough to
know the frequency h. Here mortality and morbidity statistics are
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normally used. In the second case, the calculus is more compli-
cated; here accidents statistics are normally used. In both cases,
however, one has to deal not with the future as such, but rather
with an observation of the future. Compared to medieval insurance
reasoning the very idea that it is possible to observe the unobserv-
able by means of a fiction is the same. The medieval merchant put
his trust in a proto-probabilistic estimate which was based on
personal experience. On the contrary, the modern insurance
company employs a complex actuarial mathematics. Yet they both
start from the assumption that “the future will bear a resemblance
to the past; that under the same circumstances the same event will
tend to recur with a definite numerical frequency [. . .]” (Boole 1958
[1854]: 244f.).
In this way the medieval merchant had developed a temporal
orientation that was really different from that of the Church,
although the latter remains the leading one until the early-
modernity.12 In the 17th century the idea that the future is already
determined is still prevailing in the society, while the very fact that it
cannot be known is simply the consequence of the bounded ratio-
nality of human being. And if statistical calculations show that there
is a regularity in the occurrence of chance, this is interpreted as an
evidence of Providence. Also the idea of making the future present is
conceived of as an institutionally unfeasible possibility. The problem
is managed through the concept of sollicitudo. According to Francis
Bacon (1842 [1597], I: 68), wordly cases may have or not a measure.
The latter are unprofitable since they “oppress the mind and aston-
ish the judgment”; they also are profane, “as those which savour of
a mind which promiseth to itself a certain perpetuity in the things of
this world”. Men should therefore live in the present, not projected
into the future. They should be day’s men, not to-morrow’s men. The
latter have toomuch cares. And the excess arises either becausemen
dwell longer in their cares “than is requisite for due deliberating or
firm resolving”, or because the chain of cares is “spun out to an over
great length, and unto time too far off, as if we could bind the divine
providence by our provision”.
Even though between the last 17th and the first half of the 18th
century the mathematics of probability had already made available
solutions which seemed custom-made for insurance industry, for a
century they went unheeded. Hence the question has been raised,
why people did so long prefer to bet on the future instead of
planning it.13 The sociological hypothesis is that behind the arising
of an insurance society there are deep structural changes which
imply the functional differentiation of an economic system and
the institutionalization of a new temporality consistent with the
primacy of money in the whole society.
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What Bacon conceived of as an excess actually coincides with the
temporality that money makes operative and insurance finally
institutionalizes. The chain of cares has no limit in so far that time
get into the time and the time-to-come is experienced as an open
future (cf. Luhmann 2006 [1992]; Esposito 2013: 325ff.). “Open”
means that the future does not exist and that is why it may be
created and re-created over and over again by the observer who put
together his own past and future and so produces temporal cae-
suras while making decisions. Whereas for medieval men the
presentification of the future was an absurdity since the future
does not exist and worrying about the future meant worrying about
nothing, for modern men who live in an insurance society the
presentification of the future means the creation of possibilities
that otherwise would not exist.
Obviously, the not-actual may not be actualized in an arbitrary
way. The time-to-come should be problematized and de-
problematized in order to get information. In this respect the cal-
culus of probability has a clear advantage. It turns the regularities
of chance – a very oxymoron – into rules for decision-making.14
Through reckoning the future is not more certain, that is reckoning
does not eliminate the danger. It rather produces a fiction (the
average man, the average life expectancy and so on) through which
it is possible to know and even quantify what can not be known,
and that is why it is employed for acting not for knowing, since it
offers to the decision-maker an “ersatz security” which gives him
the illusion of controlling what is and remains uncontrollable.15 In
other words, the reckoning observer does not control the environ-
ment, he rather controls his lack of control on the environment and
makes the riskiness of the enterprise somehow manageable. The
aleatory of insurance contracts thus performs an integrative func-
tion, without the same integration becoming aleatory (after having
received a premium the insurer is committed). For both the insurer
and the policyholder the matter is not that of calculating the bet,
but that of betting on calculus.
In this sense, a real “insurance company” – hence, a real
“insurance society”16 – arises when the trade of uncertainty is
institutionalized by means of the calculus of probability. The
reluctance to employ this calculus may be culturally interpreted
as resistance to the idea that the calculation of uncertainty can
produce certain results. To go beyond this threshold of plausibi-
lity the early modern society should accept two counter-intuitive
presuppositions:
(1) on the one hand, it should accept the idea that the only way
out of too many risks is to run more risks than before. This
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is one of the core principle of modern insurance industry (cf.
Albrecht 1992: 21; Farny 1995: 33ff., 37ff.). Only when risks
are shared by a pool of policyholders the calculus, i.e. the
fiction may function. The regularities which arise from the
aggregates of individual cases enables the company to balance
claims expenses both in social and temporal terms. Insurers
did always know it. Long before something like the calculus of
probability was invented, Benedetto Cotrugli (1602 [1573]: 75)
had suggested to underwrite “al continuo, & sopra ogni nave,
perché l’una ristora l’altra, & di molti [the insurer] non può
che guadagnare” (continuously and upon every ship, since
they balance each another and through many policies [the
insurer] makes a profit for sure). This does not remove the
danger that the claim is catastrophic or that the disaster
occurs sooner as foreseen. Yet, only after the arising of
modern society Cotrugli’s suggestion becomes a business
routine.
(2) The unusual idea should further be accepted that the problem
is the solution. Time means at the same time uncertainty and
certainty. What matters only depends on the standpoint from
which it is observed: whether that of insurers or that of actu-
arial mathematicians (cf. Daston 1988: 115). Indeed, between
the last 18th and the early 19th century it seems very clear that
“nothing is more proverbially uncertain than the duration of
human life, when the maxim is applied to an individual; yet
there are few things less subject to fluctuation than the average
duration of a multitude of individuals” (Babbage 1826 [2000]:
249 italics added). For the company this means that the bigger
the pool of policyholders, hence the social spreading of binding
insurance relationships is, the bigger the probability is that
risks balance themselves as time goes by. This doesn’t mean –
as somebody has suggested – that among policyholders some
kind of solidarity arises in so far that insurance socializes
responsibilities.17 The matter is not, as in medieval gilds and
self-help communities, that of being member of a network of
personal relationships where reciprocity works as a constraint
for reproducing solidarity against dangers to which everybody
is equally exposed. The matter rather is to take part in a
market where trading risks and uncertainty is a way of getting
profit opportunities. In this case reciprocity is only, so to
speak, the epiphenomenon of the calculus of probabilities and
the only solidarity one may speak of is the generalized, sys-
temic trust in the circulation of money. In a society where
money stopped to be changed every insurance would be
meaningless.
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4. Time Construction in Insurance Society
Future, like every system’s environment, remains in itself unreach-
able. Systems on the other hand always operate in the current
present. The system does not therefore react to the future as such,
but to its own construction of the future. The result is that the real
future is not simply the consequence of the system’s operations, as
though reality were a trivial machine, but rather the result of the
system’s reactions to its own representation of the future. The
system, one might say, gets ready to react to a future which never
coincides with the future that afterwards becomes present. In
insurance companies such a problem takes shape in budget
administration, and particularly in the calculus of reserves.
Sociological system theory begins with the assumption that time
is a form of observation based on the distinction before/after. The
distinction cannot distinguish itself while it is used to observe
reality. Consequently, every construction of time includes a blind
spot that coincides with the observer himself. Without such a blind
spot one could not speak of time as something real. Insurance
companies temporally find their bearings through the construction
of “periods”.18 Each period is marked by a beginning and an end.
Such marks can in turn be observed through the distinction
before/after.
Retroactive insurance, for example, provides cover for damages
that have been caused by accidents which happened before the
policy was taken out. In medieval early marine insurance contracts,
such a possibility was already contemplated and managed by a
clause which could make premium rates increase rapidly, in the
event that the insurer suspected that the ship had already been
wrecked. Instead, so-called “loss reserves” are a particular form of
premium reserve that makes it possible for the insurer to cope with
expected claims for damages that have already happened but which
have not yet been settled by the end of the insurance period. Within
the period it is possible to mark further temporal caesuras on the
basis of fiscal years. Hence the necessity arises of setting other
reserves, as for example the “premium reserves” which can be
calculated on the basis of several methods. The most important
probably is the so-called pro rata temporis method. Given a
premium of 100 which includes 60 as net premium, 35 for
expenses and 5 for profit, starting from the assumption that the
contract has been concluded on 30th September 2010 and lasts one
year, an amount of 45 in the form of reserve (i.e. negative stake
during the current fiscal year) shall be transferred to the year 2011.
Of particular interest are the so-called “equalisation funds”. They
were introduced in the 1920s and served to balance the fluctuations
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of indemnities or provide cover for highly unlikely but very expensive
risks, thereby keeping the incoming premium fixed.19 Their function
is a temporal balance reached by saving, in a prudential way, during
the best years in order to create a fund from which the company can
later draw off money to face extraordinary needs in the worst years
(see Gürtler 1959: 152f.; Karten 1988: 763ff.). In short: the company
expects deviations in the calculus of claim settlement during
the time and reacts in advance through a saving strategywhich takes
the form of a fund. The company deals not only with the uncer-
tainty of the future but also with the uncertainty of the calculus
of uncertainties; it copes not only with the unforeseen but also
with the unforeseeable (i.e. with surprises) and it makes antici-
pated corrections available in sight of errors which have not yet been
made.
In any case, the basic problem of all reserves is that the company
cannot retain the whole premium, listing it in the budget as profit,
but must put aside premium shares to secure the company’s future
commitments: in short, to ensure its solvency. The company’s profit
therefore depends on the future uncertainty. But how can one
predict how much to put aside if the future is uncertain? The
approach, as always, is to prepare in the present the past one will
need in the future, knowing that without a providence of this kind,
in the future it could be too late. German economic theory of
insurance speaks of “calculus of success” (Erfolgsrechnung): since
no company can know in advance what kind of or how many
accidents it will have to pay out in coming years, the solution is to
take into account the previous years so as to draw information from
this experience and produce more or less probable inferences about
the coming years. This separation and recombination of past and
future horizons on the basis of short- and long-term rationality is a
never-ending process and it makes a correction of inferences pos-
sible on the basis of the future that in the meantime has become
past (cf. Gürtler 1931: 18). Insurance society operates in this very
sense as an anticipatory learning system.
This brings the reasoning back to the insurance “principle of
realisation”. Like all decisions, the underwriting of an insurance
contract unfolds temporal horizons which would not exist without
the decision. The matter is not simply that each decision is taken
over time; more radically, it is that time itself is produced by
decisions. Social systems cannot depend on the immediacy of their
constantly changing relation to the environment and leave the
reproduction of their operations to chance. Time is used to increase
the system’s complexity and make the improbability of its repro-
duction more probable. This can be done in several ways. In the
case of an insurance society, for instance, the premium cannot be
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held back and paid out only at the end of the period when the total
number of claims and the average cost of indemnities to be shared
among all insured parties is definitely known; this would relieve the
insurer of all risk and leave the policyholder uncertain of the
premium to be paid. On the contrary, the main function of insur-
ance consists in taking up the certainty of an actual cost in order
to rid oneself of the uncertainty of future costs, without having the
certainty that one has done the right thing. And vice versa: if the
policyholder is rid of the uncertainty of his future, the insurer
cannot arbitrarily set the premium amount while awaiting the
future to see if the calculus was right or wrong. Any insurer’s
decision would otherwise be burdened with an unbearable uncer-
tainty (Gürtler 1931: 15).
Every insurer has therefore to cope from the very beginning with
the uncertainty of the future – a performance that coincides with
the function of money and of economy in general (cf. § 5). Such a
form of providence, however, comes up against difficulties which
depend on the fact that time is an observer’s construction. Insurers
face, in this sense, the paradox of coping with the unknown in a
known way, giving to that the operative form of a premium. In this
regard Werner Mahr (1951: 228) spoke of “insurance-technical
relation of indeterminacy”: the more exactly the total sum of indem-
nities the insurance company has to pay is established, the more
indeterminate and uncertain is the premium that has to be cashed
to face such commitment; and conversely, the more exactly the
premium amount to be paid is established, the more indeterminate
and uncertain is the company’s capacity to ensure its perfor-
mances. The business success of insurance companies clearly
depends on this dilemma. But the dilemma becomes irresolvable
when one takes into account that the very attempt to calculate the
future is observed in the society and produces reactions. Compa-
nies do not take into account, in other words, that the insurance
cover they offer is a starting point for those insured, not the result
of their decisions. To re-introduce such effect into the calculus they
should take into account the very fact that the future depends on
reaction to the availability of a calculus about the future, yet it is
very hard to control such self-referential dynamics, as the well
known problem of moral hazard clearly proves.
5. Reciprocity and Money
In order to fully understand the evolutionary improbability of the
insurance institution, a socio-historical comparison may be useful.
The basic assumption is that social time becomes a trade object
through binding relationships. The presence of a third party makes
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time scarcer but also ensures against the uncertainty of the future
(cf. Esposito 2010: 61). In this respect, sociological theory has from
the very beginning recognized two main alternatives: reciprocity
and money.
In archaic societies people dealt with the uncertainty of future
needs through reciprocity. They who gave (i.e. made gifts) bound
their partners and increased their regard among them.20 Such
regard – like capital – was a measure of the future one could rely on.
This connects to the fact that, as a rule, a gift should not be
returned immediately. What in a modern economy is regarded as
normal, in a primitive economy was conceived of as deviant. A
simultaneous return had indeed meant giving up any social bond
and, more importantly, nullifying the production of available time.
The delay of counter-performance, on the contrary, ensured a
future enjoyment of goods for the satisfaction of still indeterminate
needs. Under conditions of low complexity, the network of personal
contacts relied on the psychic memories of the people involved.
Deferment could also be symbolized through objects which were
given at the moment of performance. These symbols of deferment
were symbols of binding and their main advantage was their social
visibility: on the one hand, they could be traded as objects; on the
other, as symbols, they made the availability of social time arising.
Symbols combined, in other terms, the need for marking something
so abstract and immaterial as time-to-come with the possibility of
giving to this mark a social concreteness. Hence, a primitive form of
money arose: it functioned not as a medium of exchange, but as a
guarantee of reciprocity. Such semi-objects reinforced the chain of
mutual performances and worked at the same time as memory-aids
for later counter-performances (Thurnwald 1936: 284): a way of, so
to speak, remembering the future.
In primitive societies, therefore, reciprocity was the most impor-
tant means of creating temporal bonds.21 Here, performances and
counter-performances linked together in a circular rather than a
linear way, so that every action was already a reaction to past
reactions – a recursivity with neither beginning nor end. The result
was a widespread and generalised debt of gratitude which in
modern money economics is replaced by a widespread and
generalised indebtedness. In both cases, indeed, the matter is the
social trading of time. They who bound people by means of a debt
of gratitude (i.e. through gifting), got a credit that could stretch
endlessly, being renewed periodically by ritual events like festivals
or wedding meetings. This kind of time-binding through reciprocal
commitment only works if a reference to the past in the form of
memory, and a reference to the future in the form of expectation are
combined together. Only those who remember that they have
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received aid and support can expect that sooner or later the giver
will expect a counter-performance.
In tribal societies the temporal boundaries of memories and
expectations are widely indeterminate, fading backwards into the
darkness of past generations and forwards into the lack of dues
necessary for full payment. In these societies the never-ending
production of temporal caesuras which modern insurance compa-
nies make possible had been incomprehensible, taking into
account the fact that in the latter case any caesura depends on a
contractual decision, whereas in primitive societies reciprocity is a
duty institutionalised on the level of the whole society. The capacity
to loose and recombine temporal caesuras depends on the greater
abstraction of modern insurance institutions, which set aside all
binding primary social relationships (order or family membership)
and construct their reference to reality through fictions whose
advantage consists of their consistency with a society no longer
based on interactions. In this way, the requisite of social solidarity
is no longer the common destiny of those who are exposed to the
same dangers, but the reflexivity of risk proneness.
6. Saving or Insurance?
Insurance is based on the money-mechanism; it has been rightly
defined as a “bare money business” (Endemann 1866: 551). Money
itself is a form of providence for the future (cf. Luhmann 2005
[1970]: 259f., 269; 1988: 268): it ensures the satisfaction of inde-
terminate needs. Money, like economy on the whole, makes it
possible to postpone any decision about the satisfaction of future
needs, while at the same time ensuring the satisfaction itself in the
current present. In this sense, capital is a measure of the certainty
of possibilities of coping with the uncertainty of time-to-come.22
Insurance exploits the reflexivity of money-mechanism (both
money and the contingent availability of money may be bought and
sold for money) and sharpens the providence function of the eco-
nomic system: insurance turns the uncertainty of future needs into
the certainty of a current requirement.23 It is not enough to resign
oneself to the emergence of critical situations and wait and see what
will happen; it is necessary to somehow provide for it already in the
present, that is in advance. Uncertainty is not turned into certainty
– how many and what kind of needs will arise in the future remains
unforeseeable; one can however prepare a certain way to manage
the uncertainty of the future without deleting it. On the contrary,
uncertainty is doubled: providence, like any form of precaution, ever
implies costs (here the insurance premium) that could also be
unnecessary. One copes in this case with the basic uncertainty of
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criteria for managing the uncertainty of the future. In sociological
terms, one runs a risk.
This, however, still fails to explain why one does not prefer to save
money rather than taking out an insurance policy. This opposition
somehow replicates the binary structure of the economy code.
Starting from the problem of money scarcity, one has to decide
whether to pay or to abstain. Saving normally takes place in order
to satisfy indeterminate needs: one provides for future needs as if
they were certain and produces a kind of second-order certainty;
that is, if the need really arises, one has the financial means to
satisfy it. This in turn generates problems of money allocation on
the basis of long- and short-term rationality, according to which too
many worries about future needs would be irrational in relation to
the satisfaction of current needs and vice versa.24 From saving as
such, however, one cannot get any criteria to answer the question
about allocation. How is it possible to know how much money must
be saved if it is impossible to know what needs will really arise in
the future?
A further question may be raised: saving takes time. The one who
saves must have time enough to put money aside, while the one
who takes out an insurance policy has cover from the very moment
he pays the premium. Here the functional advantage of insurance
can be grasped. Those who save rather than pay give up taking
decisions and wait until they have money enough to face their
needs, which in the meantime could change, making saving insuf-
ficient or even unnecessary.25 On the contrary, those who take out
insurance buy the time they would have spent putting aside the
sum of money indispensable for satisfying more or less indetermi-
nate needs. The matter is not, as the so-called “theory of needs”
stated, to reduce the costs of possible needs which could arise in
the future to a minimum, allocating the required savings among
policy holders, but rather and in a more radical way to reduce any
coping with the uncertainty of the future to a certain cost. In this
way, the management of contingency becomes calculable, again
twice over: first, by the insurance company, where the saving/
insurance dilemma re-appears in the form of options between
reserve or re-insurance (see above § 4); secondly, by the insured,
who can now put the cost of the insurance premium into his budget
and use the future at his disposal (that is, the time along which he
has insurance cover for possible needs whose satisfaction is
ensured as soon as the premium is paid) for acting and taking
decisions. What is calculated is not the future as such, which still
remains unforeseeable, but one’s current relation to the uncer-
tainty of the future. In this very sense premium is the price of the
observation of the future.
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The most striking consequence of all is that in this way the
motivation to run risks increases.26 Risk is a self-reference concept
which designates any coping with the uncertainty of the future in
decision-making processes. Those who run a risk know that
dangers depend on something else (for medieval merchants either
on sea or on other men), but the economic consequences of
damages depend on themselves and on any precaution they even-
tually took (or took not). The merchant who loses a cargo at sea,
does so because of a storm or pirates, but he can avoid financial
ruin if, by facing these dangers, he providentially took out insur-
ance. Risk works therefore on a more abstract level which implies
a redoubling of reality: every event receives a dual status, as
irreparable damage and as repayable risk.27 In the first case one
has to deal with the irreversibility of the real; in the second case one
has to deal with an economic reversibility which could also be
unnecessary (the policy holder who falls ill gets money back, not
health). In this way, insurance turns every danger into a risk
(Luhmann 1996 [2013]) and makes available a kind of “time bind”
that enables people to take decisions which are right also when
they are wrong: it is much better to take out an insurance and run
the risk of paying premium in vain than be caught off-balance.
On the other hand, uncertainty is the main resource for taking
decisions. But it must be to some extent manageable. Were every-
thing otherwise possible, the mere injunction “Take a decision!”
would be paralyzing. The evolutionary advantage of the insurance
institution is that it enables a calculation of future uncertainties
even though it does not ensure the certainty of the future outcome,
so that the uncertainty the whole society is able to cope with finally
increases instead of decreasing.
Notes
1 This is the opinion of Ericson, Doyle and Barry (2003: 3). Cf. also
Baker and Simon (2002), especially the essays of the first part of the book,
whose title is “Toward a Sociology of Insurance and Risk” (italics added).
2 Kimura (1965; 1983) demonstrated that the modern Japanese marine
insurance policy derives from the 18th-century Lloyd’s policy, which in turn
is a faithful reproduction of the 14th-century Florentine policy.
3 About this requisite see Nehlsen-von Stryk (1988: 84, 88ff.): the
Venetian uxanza coincides with the Florentine insurance laws and they
both were to be recovered by the Ordinances of Barcelona.
4 The concept of motivation should be understood in a sociological,
rather than psychological, sense. For the present inquiry it is of no impor-
tance to know what medieval merchants thought of the use of money for
trading; it is of great importance to understand what kind of reasoning
made more probable such an improbable decision as the insurance
risk.
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5 The main empirical enquiries are those of Mario del Treppo (1957:
512ff., 520ff.; 1972, Appendix II: 639–733) relative to the commercial
circles of Barcelona during the 15th century; those of Alberto Tenenti (1978;
1987; with Branislava Tenenti 1985: 63ff.; Table III: 341ff. and Appendix II)
relative to the commercial circles of Ragusa during the 16th century; and
lastly those of Federigo Melis (1975) regarding the Tuscan insurance
market between the 15th and 16th century. See also Nehlsen-von Stryk
(1988, Ch. I and Appendix I), and Branislava Tenenti (1985) for the com-
mercial circles of Venice; Heers (1959: 12ff.) and Doehaerd (1949) for the
commercial circles of Genoa.
6 Cf. Demosthenes, Against Lacritos, xxxv, 10–13, in which the interest
rate rises from 225‰ to 300‰ if the ship sets sail after the first day of
autumn.
7 See the fundamental observations of Knight (1921: 128, 167). The
psychological concept of “illusion of control” has been used by Langer
(1975) to designate the change of external with internal attributions. What
should be conceived of as a matter of chance (luck) is rather conceived of
as a matter of ability (skill).
8 According to Luhmann (1991: 81) risk is a form for form-shaping in
the medium of probable/improbable.
9 Lessio (1609: 310): “Periculum sortis incertum debet reduci ad
certum pretium”.
10 The inquiries of Alberto and Branislava Tenenti (1985: 243ff., 370)
about marine insurance contracts concluded in Ragusa between 1563 and
1591 have shown that the average gain of insurers were consistent with the
average frequency of claims (about 5%).
11 Premium “atque accrescit vel decrescit non solum pro maiori aut
minori valore rei quae assecuratur, sed etiam pro maiori vel minori periculo
cui assecurator se exponit” (Molina 1733, II, Disp. DVII: 659) – listing three
main criteria: the kind of ship on which the cargo has been loaded, the
length of trip, the presence of pirates.
12 According to the well known thesis of Jacques Le Goff (2000 [1977]).
13 Daston (1987: 244). Cf. moreover the important study of Clark (1999:
esp. 115, 117ff.), who to some extent reassessed Daston’s conclusions.
14 That is for betting. Cf. Coumet (1970: 584).
15 Cf. Esposito (2007a: esp. 100).
16 The double meaning is intentional.
17 See Helten (1986: 237), who speaks of “Solidargemeinschaft” (joint
community), and Baker (2002: 33–34), for whom insurance would perform
a function of social control.
18 Cf. Gürtler (1931: 16) and Farny (1992) on the basis of the distinction
“internal/external calculus of periods”.
19 Instead of the so-called “reserves for catastrophic risks”, today insur-
ance companies prefer to take out re-insurance policies, but this issue goes
beyond the limits of the present inquiry.
20 The classical sociological inquiry is that of Mauss (1923–24). See also
Thurnwald (1936: 281ff.).
21 According to Luhmann (1997: 651f.) social time arises through gift.
See further Luhmann (1988: 307): primitive societies embody time through
gift and gratefulness.
22 Or in short: a problematisation and de-problematisation of future
need satisfaction (Luhmann 1988: 64f.). See further Esposito (2007b:
267ff.).
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23 See Manes (1913, § 3: 13). The leading work is Gobbi (1938).
24 About such incompatibilities cf. Mahr (1966).
25 According to Luhmann (1995: 574) the irrationality of saving in an
economy based on indebtedness depends precisely on this.
26 It has been always recognized but without explanation. Cf. Gobbi
(1938, § 41: 30); Arrow (1974: 137): insurance “permits individuals to
engage in risky activities which they would not otherwise undertake”.
27 Cf. Ewald (1989: 391). Such redoubling has a correspondence in the
redoubling of scarcity that is produced by money.
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